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PANEL AND AUDIENCE DIALOGUE
The members of Volume 68 have excerpted questions and answers from the panel and audience dialogue that transpiredon the
day of the Symposium. In this sampling of the proceedings,
Jeanne Cullinan Ray, Michael S. Sirkin, and Norman P. Stein*
discuss the case of Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund and address the principle of anti-alienation,the fiduciary duties of trustees, and the effects of bankruptcy law on pension
plans. They conclude that the laws will continue to favor pensioners, but that the issues must still be resolved in the courts. In addition, David George Ball discusses the role and position of pension
funds in the financial markets, the concept and effects of economically targeted or social investing, and the government's attraction
to the trillion-dollarpension establishment. Mr. Ball concludes
that the funds should not be redistributedto allay social and economic problems. Rather, he states that managers must maximize
their returns to benefit plan participantsand not politicians.
THE AUDIENCE: Mr. Ball, you seem very enthusiastic
about the increased authority of institutional investors. Do you
see any downside to their increased influence in the marketplace?
MR. BALL: On the contrary, I do not believe that there was
any real representation of pensioners during the 1970s and perhaps the early 1980s. At that time, investors generally spoke with
management and, if unsatisfied, the investors withdrew their
moneys. That was the Wall Street rule, and there was no economic democracy. The chairs were not being voted; the pensioners
were not being represented.
THE AUDIENCE: To follow up on that question, do you believe that pension funds are seeking the same type of performance
that other shareholders demand, or do they have more of an interest in long-term performance?
MR. BALL: Again, I think pension funds will have a benefieffect
because the pressure on the chief executive, of course, is
cial
earnings. This tends to focus matters on short-term profits. Pension funds have a long horizon because the pension funds are pro* Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. Professor Stein participated in the Symposium and Panel and Audience Dialogue.
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viding for somebody to retire in thirty-five years, so they can afford to be patient investors.
THE AUDIENCE: Do you think that pension funds will seek
a more limited involvement because of the insider trading rules
and concerns about fiduciary responsibility?
MR. BALL: As I said in my speech, fund managers are unlikely to put their own people on the board. I think what they will
do is drive for independent directors. A separation is very valuable because, after all, directors have their own rules that are going
to guide them in board decisions, so I think these concerns would
have a beneficial effect. I do not think it is going to be a negative.
You cannot be more focused on short-term results than we are at
the moment. Thus, the effect is likely to allow management to
have more time. The pension funds are not going to dump a new
CEO in three months if he has a bad quarter; they are going to
give him a chance.
THE AUDIENCE: Thus far pension funds activism has come
primarily from public funds. Why do you think that is the case?
MR. BALL: It is true that the leadership has come mostly
from the public plans. Public plans, I suppose, are political institutions and have been more willing to be proactive. But as I suggested with TIAA-CREF, with Campbell's Soup, with the big corporations that have joined the councils of institutional investorsGeneral Motors and other large companies-there is going to be a
ripple effect. Public plans have provided the leadership, but it is
going to ripple through the marketplace. There is some evidence
that that is already happening, but it will be slow, occurring over
the next ten to fifteen years.
In addition, a lot of the private funds use outside money managers and investment managers. These outside managers are
worried about current results and whether they are going to be
replaced. They have a lot less incentive or direction other than to
make returns. To a large extent, therefore, money managers are
taking a secondary seat to the internally managed funds. General
Motors, for example, is doing a lot of internal management and
they pursue a more long-range goal. I think you will probably see
a bigger role as there is more internal management of plans.
The bottom line of this whole thing is that the proxy is an
asset, and if you are intelligent in the way you vote your proxy you
can add value to your investment. This is not just a rule for public
plans, it is equally true for private plans. Private plans are begin-
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ning to realize that how they vote their shares effects the value of
their investments.
THE AUDIENCE: The concept of social investing is not a
new one; it has been around for some time. But many people
seemed to believe that social investing and section 404 of ERISA
and fiduciary responsibility were contradictions in terms. Do you
see that philosophy changing within the Department of Labor?
MR. BALL: You raise a good question, one that is very relevant to the Clinton administration. In the campaign, President
Clinton talked about economically targeted investing, which is a
form of social investing, where pension plans might be required to
invest a part of their portfolio in the infrastructure-bridges, public buildings, sewers, and prisons. He has since retreated from
that position because he realized it would constitute a flagrant violation of ERISA.
The fiduciary's duty and sole purpose is to consider only what
is in the best interests of the plan participants and beneficiaries,
and not what is good for society. It is not going to be reassuring to
senior citizens who are collecting their pension check when they
suddenly discover that they got less money and the fiduciary says,
"Well, you really ought to feel good about this because we used
that money for social investing. We put it in for some wonderful
things in the community and we built some highways. But you
are going to have a little less pension money." Those senior citizens are going to be mad.
The Clinton administration and also Helena Burr, my successor, have backed off, making social investing voluntary. There is
no change once it is voluntary. You decide where you will invest.
If you find two equal investments and one of them is socially redeeming, that is fine. But you may not use that money for a social
or political purpose. Basically, your job is to maximize. You have
to remember that the money belongs to the pension plan and not
to the politicians.
MR. STEIN: I have a question about economically targeted
investments. I agree that it would violate ERISA, but is there an
argument that we should require some dedication of assets to certain kinds of infrastructure investments that will improve the
committee overall? Pension plans have a lot of money. No pension plan wants to be the single plan to make that investment.
Other plans will let you make the investment. You will receive a
permanent return on your money, but the plan managers will ben-
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efit as well. If you require some assets to be dedicated, however,
you might improve the underlying performance of the committee
as you improve roads, bridges, highways, and the like.
MR. BALL: Well, maybe I am a little conservative here, but I
do not believe that there is room for economically targeted investments. It is very hard to carry social investing over to the individual pension plan just because it is good for society. You may remember our reaction when elderly people were promised
improvements in insurance, only to discover that they were going
to have to pay for it themselves. It was a political reaction. I
think that is the kind of political reaction we would have here.
Senior citizens in this country would not accept that.
The experience of social investing is very checkered. For example, the state of Connecticut, my home state, had the brilliance
to invest in the coal industry. They put in thirty or forty billion
dollars and lost almost everything. That was social investing.
What about the fiasco in Kansas where the state and local industry invested 100 million dollars in venture capital in start-up businesses? The business of social investing is very difficult. What
helps one group-I sometimes think that this "group" must be the
construction industry, and I want to know because down at Renaissance Weekend where President Clinton used to go every year
for about twelve years, there were people there from the construction trade, and I wonder if he didn't pick up a little construction
industry slant from those weekends and all those people in the
industry who talked about the way the roads were falling apartdoes not necessarily benefit another.
There is no question that the roads are falling apart, but I do
not think you can rebuild them on the backs of the elderly people
of this country. However, it's a political issue, and it is a health
care issue. The world changes. My view is that the money belongs to the plan and not the politicians. Once you give it to the
politicians it is in danger. It is best to never let that happen.
I think there is a real Sutton principal here. Somebody once
asked the great bank robber Willie Sutton, "Willie, why did you
rob banks"? He said, "I guess that is because that's where the
money was," and that is what politicians are doing. It is the Willie
Sutton principal in pension plans. Today, the money is in pension
plans, and the Willie Suttons are the politicians. They are going
where the money is.
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THE AUDIENCE: I have a question for Ms. Ray. You talked
about the interaction between the Bankruptcy Code and ERISA
and the way a participant's benefits are protected from creditors.
What about the opposite situation? What happens when a trustee
or another named fiduciary commits a fiduciary breach and then
declares bankruptcy? Can he or she be sued or would those violations be discharged by the Bankruptcy Code?
MS. RAY: I do not think that the Bankruptcy Code would
necessarily discharge those violations. Much of it would depend
upon the type of suit and the timing of the final petition of bankruptcy. For the most part, it has not been a serious concern. Once
again, I believe that the matter will involve a balancing act, with
the Supreme Court resolving the issue as it did in Patterson v.
Shumate. It is the type of thing where you have two markedly
different statutes, each of which is a significant piece of
legislation.
MS. STABILE: Let me direct a question to Ms. Ray. In discussing both the Guidry case and the Patterson case you told us
enough about the facts to indicate that the plaintiffs were not particularly sympathetic in either case. I am wondering whether in
your view any part of the anti-alienation analysis ought to consider the plaintiff's actions, or if anti-alienation is a principal that
is so strong that we should not be concerned at all with the plaintiff's wrongdoing.
MS. RAY: I think a number of people were very surprised by
the Supreme Court's decision in Guidry. The plaintiff in that case
embezzled plan funds, and the Court essentially concluded that
there would not be any offset. Prior to ERISA, there were provisions known as "bad boy clauses" that were incorporated into pension plans to allow an employer to defeat employees' ability to collect the benefits to the extent they had their hand in the till or
otherwise committed some sort of malfeasance. These acts normally amounted to a misdemeanor, and occasionally, a felony. On
that score, I think people believe that Guidry is the wrong result.
The result is one that, frankly, gives lawyers a bad name. It is the
sort of thing which, I think, is a gut reaction. People intuitively
think that it is wrong. In Guidry, the Court was trying to make a
point that this was, indeed, a very precious right in terms of protecting pension plans.
In addition, the case differs from Pattersonwhen one looks at
the timing of the declaration of bankruptcy for the corporation and
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the plaintiff's excellent legal counsel, who provided the best possible advice on every point of minutia. I also believe that the plaintiff was not as unappealing a person in terms of good guy/bad guy
syndrome or basic fairness. As an ERISA lawyer, I found it very
reassuring, I admit, that the Court came down on the side of protecting pension benefits even in such an inappropriate case. I
think that they viewed it not just from the standpoint of that particular plaintiff, but also from the standpoint of others who would
be relying on this.
MR. STEIN: That was the only issue where, I think, you had
plaintiffs' and defendants' ERISA counsel on the same side.
THE AUDIENCE: Carrying that theory a little further, suppose the plaintiff's embezzlement had caused the company to go
bankrupt. What would have been the result? Say the money is
gone and now the plan is insolvent or the company goes bankrupt.
Guidry only involved 300-something thousand dollars and the
company was able to sustain that loss. Suppose there was insurance or something to cover that. What would you think of the equities if other plan participants could not get the benefit?
MS. RAY: If you are viewing it in terms of sheer equity, it
would seem inappropriate to allow this particular pension plan
participant to benefit by both embezzling the funds (although, presumably, criminal action would be taken against him) and also
collecting his benefits at the same time. That is just a question of
pure equity.
As far as measuring what the right rule ought to be, if you are
going to have general rules to try to explore, I believe in the long
run, in an employer-supported pension plan or a union-sponsored
pension plan, it is appropriate to try and protect the plan participant, especially if the participant does not have free accessibility
to retrieve the funds.
MR. SIRKIN: In my mind, it has always been illogical to argue that no one can attach a pension plan while it remains financially sound, but that as soon as there is financial trouble someone
can levy on it. People cannot secure it; they cannot give their
money away. It is illogical to say that bankruptcy law will force a
party to relinquish plan funds if they are thrown into bankruptcy.
That money is supposed to be there for your future.
MR. STEIN: There is another factor. The government has
put the money into the retirement plan. It is not just your money;
the government is contributing tax benefits. Thus the person that
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puts the money there is not the only settlor of that trust. The government has that interest because it wants money to be there for
retirement. I do not know if this is worth mentioning, but you
asked earlier what would have happened if the plan had gone
bankrupt. Guidry involved somebody who embezzled from the
union. I think you had a plan official who embezzled from the
plan.
MS. RAY: As a matter of fact, I think your comments are
squarely on point because if, rather than Guidry, the plan had
sought the benefit, there might have possibly been, or at least a
number of people would say that there would have been, a different result in the sense that there might have been a plan interest.
MR. SIRKEIN: In that instance you could set-off against his
benefit if the fiduciary breached his duty to the plan. This has
been the result in the bulk of the lower court decisions that have
dealt with the issue.

